At a store, tapping a card is the shortest payment moment the consumer sees. Behind that moment, banks, card networks, payment companies, merchants, fraud systems, data flows and regulators manage the same transaction from different positions. Money moves, but so do permission, information, risk and bargaining power.
In this essay, a payment rail means more than a technical network. It is the technical, legal and commercial arrangement that determines who can initiate, verify, reject, record, clear and, when necessary, reverse a payment claim. A card network, an instant account-to-account system and a stablecoin are not the same thing. One routes a card transaction, one moves money between bank accounts, and one represents a unit of value on a distributed ledger. Yet all three raise the same strategic question: which link in the chain becomes indispensable?
Reading key: Fact is a claim stated in a primary or institutional source. Inference is a bounded interpretation built from more than one fact. Scenario is a conditional possibility about the future. Judgment is the editorial conclusion drawn from the mechanism.
The real contest is about control points, not just speed
The thesis is simple: a new payment rail does not automatically remove the old intermediary. It changes the location of the control points. The distribution of fees, access to data, the interface through which users arrive, the party carrying compliance costs and the institution a customer must trust are all renegotiated.
Fact: For the 12 months ended September 30, 2025, Visa reported $14.2 trillion in payments volume and 257.5 billion transactions processed on its networks. The separate card count was 4.9 billion as of June 30, 2025. Those figures show that a card network is not merely a back-end cable. It is a large coordination system for acceptance and trust. Visa 2025 Annual Report
Inference: Stablecoin transactions may be technically faster or available around the clock, but that alone does not reproduce this scale. A rail’s economic power is measured not only by cost per transaction, but also by who can make a payment, who can refuse it and who resolves the problem when something goes wrong.
That is why “Will cards disappear, or will stablecoins win?” is too narrow. The more useful question is how the card interface, the bank customer relationship, the network’s acceptance and security standards, and the stablecoin issuer’s liquidity and programmability layer will combine in one transaction.
A card transaction is a four-party network of contracts
Mastercard’s 2025 Form 10-K describes a card payment network as a four-party structure: the account holder, the issuer bank, the merchant and the merchant’s bank, the acquirer. Mastercard states that it does not issue cards, extend credit or set the interest and other fees charged to account holders. In most cases, the account-holder relationship is managed by its customers. Mastercard 2025 Form 10-K
The economic spine sits here. The issuer approves the transaction. The acquirer pays the merchant after deducting interchange, a fee generally passed from the merchant side to the issuer. The merchant discount rate, the acquirer’s main charge for card acceptance, covers the acquirer’s network and service costs; additional processing and related fees may apply. The network authorizes the transaction, carries clearing information, facilitates the movement of funds between parties and, for many transactions, guarantees settlement between issuers and acquirers.
Each layer creates a different kind of value:
| Layer | Main value it controls | Its limit |
|---|---|---|
| Issuer bank | Account relationship, credit, rewards and account products | Cannot build global merchant acceptance and routing alone |
| Card network | Rules, brand, authorization, clearing, settlement and network security | Does not issue the card or open credit, and usually does not manage the end customer relationship |
| Acquirer and processor | Merchant connection, pricing, integration and risk management | Does not independently carry the consumer account or the global card brand |
| Merchant | End customer, product and sales context | Is constrained by network rules, fraud costs and acceptance fees |
| Regulator | Market entry, fee, data and consumer-protection rules | Does not directly design the daily product experience |
Fact: In 2025, Mastercard reported $19.476 billion of payment-network revenue and $13.315 billion of value-added services and solutions revenue. The second category includes security, authentication, business and market insights, gateway services, ACH and real-time account-to-account payments. Mastercard 2025 Form 10-K, revenue and services
Judgment: The card network’s power does not rest only on a fee charged per transaction. It rests on bringing four parties together under common rules and a common expectation of trust. That coordination is difficult to build and difficult to leave. A competing rail must offer more than a lower price. It must also offer comparable acceptance, fraud management, dispute handling, user habit and cross-border reach.
Fees are not fixed. They move between layers
There is no single owner of the fee in a card transaction. Interchange creates revenue for the issuer. The merchant discount rate pays for the acquirer’s service to the merchant. The network earns from switching, processing, licensing, security and data services. Regulation can change that distribution. The European Union caps interchange at 0.2% for consumer debit cards and 0.3% for consumer credit cards. In the United States, Federal Reserve Regulation II sets a basic cap for covered debit transactions of $0.21 per transaction plus 0.05% of the transaction value, with a fraud-prevention adjustment where applicable. EU Interchange Fee Regulation, Federal Reserve Regulation II
These limits are not details added after the payment architecture is built. They affect which side keeps the fee, how issuers fund rewards and which networks merchants want to route through. Mastercard also says in its 2025 Form 10-K that interchange fees are regulated in some jurisdictions and that very low fees could reduce issuers’ willingness to support card products.
Stablecoins can change part of this layer. A business may use a different liquidity path for cross-border collection or settlement outside banking hours. That does not make correspondent banking unnecessary. A financial institution may settle a card transaction with an approved stablecoin instead of conventional money. In 2025 and 2026 announcements, Visa and Mastercard said they were expanding such back-end settlement options. Visa stablecoin settlement, Mastercard stablecoin settlement, June 3, 2026
But removing one cost does not mean economic rent has disappeared. A new structure brings other costs into view:
- Access to the issuer, bank account or conversion platform that mints and redeems the stablecoin.
- Wallet and fiat-to-stablecoin conversion fees.
- Distributed-ledger transaction and network fees.
- Identity, sanctions screening, fraud prevention and dispute systems.
- Reserve liquidity management and the issuer’s operating capital.
- Incentives paid to platforms that provide merchant acceptance, wallet distribution or customer traffic.
Fact: Circle’s Form 10-Q for the six months ended June 30, 2026 says reserve income represented 94.6% of total revenue. Distribution costs tied to its Coinbase agreements were $655.3 million in the same period. Circle also says it pays blockchain transaction fees needed to complete transactions on supported networks and expects that expense to rise with volume and fees on some networks. Circle Q2 2026 Form 10-Q
Inference: In stablecoin economics, “free payments” does not mean no cost. The rent can reappear as reserve income, conversion fees, network fees or distribution agreements. Circle’s payments to Coinbase show that liquidity and distribution themselves have bargaining value in the growth of a payment instrument. This does not mean Coinbase controls every USDC customer relationship. It shows the importance of the distribution channel in negotiations with the issuer.
A new rail links three different products
The word stablecoin often compresses three different products into one:
- Unit of value: A digital token designed to remain stable against, and be redeemable for, a reference currency.
- Settlement rail: The distributed ledger on which the token is recorded and the network that validates the transaction.
- Customer layer: Wallets, exchanges, banks, payment providers, merchant interfaces and issuer services.
This distinction matters strategically. One company can issue the token while another distributes the most-used wallet. A blockchain can validate the transaction while a bank or issuer performs identity checks and redemption. A merchant can accept stablecoins while a consumer pays by card and the merchant settles in a stablecoin.
Fact: The GENIUS Act, enacted in the United States on July 18, 2025, defines a payment stablecoin as a digital asset designed for payment or settlement for which the issuer promises conversion into a fixed monetary value. The Act requires permitted issuers to maintain identifiable reserves of at least one-to-one, allows cash, on-demand deposits, Treasury securities with no more than 93 days to maturity, specified repo transactions and eligible government money-market funds, and requires disclosure of redemption policies and monthly reserve composition. GENIUS Act, Public Law 119-27
The law also prohibits an issuer from paying a holder interest or yield solely for holding, using or retaining a payment stablecoin. A permitted issuer may not condition a service on a customer taking another paid product or refusing a competitor’s product. Stablecoins may not be represented as guaranteed by the U.S. government or insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Permitted issuers are treated as financial institutions under the Bank Secrecy Act and are subject to anti-money-laundering, sanctions, customer-identification and due-diligence obligations.
These rules turn the token from a software object into a payment product with licensing, reserves, identity, records and redemption relationships. Defining a distributed ledger as a public digital ledger of verified transactions can increase transparency. It does not mean that a wallet address cannot be linked to a real person or that a token can never be frozen. The law also addresses seizure, freezing, burning and blocking transfers under lawful orders.
Judgment: Stablecoins do not eliminate intermediaries. They split the intermediary’s work into three parts. The issuer promises value and redemption, the blockchain carries the transaction, and the wallet or platform gathers customer traffic. Combining all three layers in one company can create new market power. Separating them can increase bargaining among the layers.
Fast bank payments are part of the same contest
Stablecoins are not the only challengers to cards. The Federal Reserve’s FedNow Service is an interbank infrastructure through which customers of participating banks and credit unions can send instant payments around the clock, every day of the year. The Federal Reserve explicitly says FedNow is not a currency or a consumer application. It is a high-speed highway on which banks build their own interfaces. Federal Reserve FedNow FAQ
This shows why speed alone does not determine market power. FedNow can provide fast settlement, but the bank or its application provider designs the consumer experience. Card networks are also adding real-time account-based payments, ACH and open finance to their service portfolios. Mastercard’s 2025 Form 10-K identifies cards, real-time payments and account-based transactions as part of its strategy, alongside security, data and network services for these new flows.
A 2025 BIS theoretical paper argues that when payment systems remain closed to one another, account access and trade volumes can stay inefficiently low. An interoperable fast retail-payment system can shift some market share from incumbent intermediaries to non-bank providers. This is not a market forecast. It is a model of how interoperability can change bargaining power. BIS, Competing Digital Monies
Inference: The central contest is less “card or stablecoin?” than “closed network or interoperable multi-rail system?” If users can switch wallets, banks, cards or stablecoins, every layer’s pricing power is reduced. If switching is hard, data cannot move and merchant acceptance is fragmented, even the fastest technology can create another walled garden.
Data and the customer relationship are the invisible assets
Payment data is not one thing. The merchant knows what the product is. The issuer sees funding and credit behavior. The network can compare authorization, fraud signals and transaction flows. The acquirer manages the merchant’s collection, refunds and disputes. The customer relationship and network data do not have to sit with the same institution.
In its 2025 Form 10-K, Mastercard says it provides customers with business and market insights, fraud scoring, authentication, personalization and security services built around transaction data. The same filing says digital wallets and fintech companies compete for customers and data. A network’s value therefore cannot be measured only by the number of transactions passing through it.
On the stablecoin side, the record may appear more portable. But an address on a blockchain is not the customer itself. Identity, the wallet account, the conversion account, the merchant application and compliance records can sit with different organizations. If one wallet provider controls the user experience, an issuer controls redemption and a network controls the transaction record, the relationship is split. If all three are brought into one platform, new concentration can emerge.
Judgment: The most valuable payment data is not a single transaction amount. It is the repeated context around the same user. Who pays whom, under what conditions, with what delay and what likelihood of dispute? The layer that sees and can lawfully use that context can influence the next credit decision, offer, risk decision or distribution channel. “Is the data on the blockchain or in the card network?” is therefore only half the question. The other half is who can access it and who holds the customer’s consent.
Compliance is part of the product, not the final control gate
When consumers use cards, they assume that dispute rights, fraud protection and network rules exist behind the payment. A basic stablecoin transfer is a token sent from one address to another. The experiences are not identical. Mastercard emphasizes that its new stablecoin settlement options can preserve existing fraud safeguards and dispute processes. That statement also shows that these trust layers do not automatically come from the token itself.
The GENIUS Act has been enacted, but its implementation details are not complete. In April 2026, the Treasury Department’s FinCEN and OFAC issued a proposal on anti-money-laundering and sanctions compliance. In June 2026, the Federal Reserve opened a customer-identification proposal for certain payment-stablecoin issuers. The OCC’s March 2026 proposal says it is one part of the GENIUS Act implementation and that final regulations are still required. Treasury AML proposal, Federal Reserve CIP proposal, OCC proposed rule
Fact: The GENIUS Act regulates permitted payment stablecoins. It does not place every product called a stablecoin into one safety category. The implementation scope can vary with the type of issuer and the relevant regulator.
Inference: As compliance costs rise, the rail that leads may not be the most open or cheapest one. It may be the one that can carry a licensed customer safely. That can strengthen the advantage of large banks, networks, wallets or technology platforms. A regulator that requires interoperability and customer portability can limit that advantage.
Four scenarios ahead
Scenario 1: The back end changes while the front end remains
A card network uses stablecoins not as a new payment method visible to the consumer, but as a faster settlement tool between issuers and acquirers. The consumer pays by card, the merchant receives local currency, and the network or financial institution moves liquidity with a stablecoin in the background. Mastercard’s April 2025 announcement says it is exploring ways for merchants to settle in stablecoins regardless of how the consumer pays. Visa has also announced expanded settlement capabilities for issuers and acquirers.
In this scenario, the stablecoin improves the card network’s operating hours and liquidity management instead of destroying the network. Most value remains in acceptance, brand, security, distribution and the customer relationship.
Scenario 2: The wallet captures the customer relationship
A technology platform combines the wallet, merchant acceptance, conversion and consumer balance in one interface. The stablecoin becomes the core unit of value for the platform’s account-to-account and cross-border transfers. The issuer provides reserves and redemption, but the user is the platform’s customer.
In this scenario, power can move from the card network or bank to the wallet platform. But if the platform’s regulatory obligations, redemption access, fraud protection or merchant acceptance are weak, the network effect can reverse. Product-tying rules applied to permitted issuers under the GENIUS Act can constrain how such issuer-platform relationships bind customers to other products.
Scenario 3: Interoperable multi-rail payments
Fast bank-payment systems, card networks, stablecoin issuers and open APIs connect to one another. Users move among currencies and rails without needing to know which interface is being used. No single layer controls everything. Networks compete through speed, security, data, conversion and compliance services.
A BIS report published in 2026 on its 2025 monitoring survey says broader access, longer operating hours, interoperability, common data standards and access for non-bank providers can improve competition in cross-border payments. The observation applies to the wider payment architecture, not only to stablecoins. BIS CPMI, 2025 monitoring survey
Scenario 4: Trust and operations outrun speed
The stablecoin network grows, but congestion, wallet security, redemption queues, bank access or regulatory uncertainty keep users on traditional instruments. Federal Reserve research discusses how network externalities and congestion-sensitive fees can make redemption decisions reinforce one another even when reserves are assumed to be safe. This is not an observed event or a probability forecast. It is a model showing why reserve quality alone cannot evaluate the design. Federal Reserve, The Fragility of Perfectly Safe Digital Money
The strongest counterargument
The strongest explanation against a major redistribution of market power is that new rails will be absorbed by existing powerful players.
First, Visa and Mastercard can add new payment forms to their own networks. Both are developing stablecoin settlement, real-time account-to-account payments, wallet connections and merchant solutions. These announcements are not evidence of mass realized usage, but they weaken the assumption that incumbents cannot adapt to the technology.
Second, network effects can be stronger than a new rail’s speed advantage. For a merchant to accept a new token, technical integration is only the start. The merchant also needs enough customers, reliable redemption, price stability, accounting, tax treatment, fraud controls and a refund process. Existing card acceptance or bank-account relationships raise the initial cost of moving to a new rail.
Third, fast bank payments may provide much of the same benefit with fewer new balance-sheet layers. FedNow and similar systems can settle instantly without converting bank deposits into a new token. A stablecoin’s advantage may be clearest in cross-border, programmable or out-of-hours flows. It does not automatically extend to every kind of payment.
Fourth, stablecoin demand may remain tied more to crypto-market and liquidity conditions than to everyday payment needs. In that case, a stablecoin remains a settlement asset for selected markets and cross-border transfers rather than the general carrier of consumer money.
Judgment: These explanations narrow the thesis, but they do not defeat it. The most likely outcome is not one new rail erasing every card, bank and platform layer. It is several rails sitting on top of one another in the same transaction, with the value split renegotiated between them.
Six questions for reading market power
When evaluating a new payment product, company or regulation, “Is it faster?” is not enough. These six questions create a better strategic map:
- Distribution: Through whose interface do users and merchants arrive? Who pays to create repeated use?
- Economics: Which layer keeps the value as a fee, interchange, conversion charge, reserve income, network fee or data service?
- Data: Who sees the payment context, who can analyze it and who holds the customer’s consent?
- Compliance: Who carries identity, sanctions screening, licensing, reserves, accounting and reporting obligations?
- Trust and exit: What can a user do after a mistaken or fraudulent payment? Who controls redemption, refunds, card disputes or other dispute resolution?
- Portability and resilience: How easily can a user move to another wallet, bank or rail? How does the system behave under congestion, outage or liquidity stress?
If the answers collect in one institution, that institution’s bargaining power rises. If they are distributed across institutions, interoperability and open standards matter more. If distribution sits with one platform, reserves with another institution and customer data with a third network, words such as “decentralized” or “open” are not enough. Real power is measured by which layer makes it difficult for the others to change.
Conclusion: The rail changes, but bargaining does not end
Reading the shift from cards to stablecoins as a technology change alone misses the hidden contracts of payments. Card networks connect acceptance, security, rules, data and settlement. Bank-based fast-payment systems redesign operating hours and liquidity. Stablecoins can combine a unit of value and settlement on a programmable ledger. None of them automatically solves distribution, identity, redemption, merchant acceptance or customer trust.
Judgment: Payment rails can redistribute market power in three ways: by moving the source of fees to another layer, by giving the customer and data relationship to a new wallet or platform, and by tying compliance and liquidity to a new issuer. But if existing networks learn to use new rails in the back end, technical innovation may enlarge the old network’s role instead of reducing it.
The most meaningful signals to watch are therefore these: how far card networks carry stablecoin settlement into daily operations; how much authority wallets and platforms gain over the merchant and consumer relationship; and how regulators build standards for interoperability, data portability, disputes and redemption. Speed matters. Durable market power, however, is determined by who permits the payment, who can explain the transaction and who gets the final say when something goes wrong.
This essay is not a recommendation to buy or sell any token, stock, company or payment product. It is for educational and strategic analysis purposes.
Sources
- Visa 2025 Annual Report, volume and transaction data for the 12 months ended September 30, 2025, and the June 30, 2025 card count.
- Mastercard 2025 Form 10-K, four-party network, interchange, network and value-added services, data, security and multi-rail strategy.
- Federal Reserve Regulation II, U.S. debit-card interchange and routing rules.
- Regulation (EU) 2015/751, EU debit and credit-card interchange caps.
- Federal Reserve FedNow FAQ, 24x7x365 instant payment infrastructure between bank accounts.
- BIS, Competing Digital Monies, payment instruments, interoperability and disintermediation model.
- BIS CPMI, 2025 monitoring survey published in 2026, access, standards and interoperability in cross-border fast payments.
- GENIUS Act, Public Law 119-27, payment-stablecoin definition, reserves, redemption, compliance, interest and tying restrictions.
- Circle Q2 2026 Form 10-Q, reserve income, distribution costs, Coinbase relationship and blockchain fees.
- Visa stablecoin settlement expansion, the company’s stablecoin back-end settlement plan.
- Mastercard stablecoin settlement expansion, June 3, 2026, the company’s plan to combine regulated-stablecoin settlement with existing safeguards.
- Mastercard stablecoin capabilities, April 2025, the merchant-settlement scenario regardless of the consumer payment method.
- U.S. Treasury AML proposal, proposed AML and sanctions rules under GENIUS Act implementation.
- Federal Reserve CIP proposal, proposed customer-identification requirements for certain issuers.
- OCC proposed rule, proposed scope and status of GENIUS Act implementation rules.
- Federal Reserve, The Fragility of Perfectly Safe Digital Money, official research on congestion and redemption behavior.





